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EFFECT OF CURATIVE STATUTES ON
TAXATION IN ILLINOIS
J. R. Blomquist*

C

which plague the members of the Illinois General Assembly are so recurrent that their consideration becomes a matter of routine at every session. The legislature hardly
has time to convene before a series of bills are proposed, sponsored by interested municipalities and other taxing bodies, designed to cure defects and errors which have arisen in the process
of levying taxes in the interim between the previous session and
the current one. The constant request for legislative assistance evokes a query as to whether the taxing officials of the
state should not be skilled, by this time, in the processes of taxation so as to be able to avoid such mistakes, but so long as each
session brings statutory modification in the fundamental laws,
and so long as taxing statutes are as complicated as they are,
it is not surprising that errors do creep in. If the taxing machinery were operated by lawyers experienced in detailed statutory requirements, the picture might be different. But many
taxing bodies perform their functions on the basis of information handed down by predecessors in office, often completely ignorant of changes in the taxing laws, hence necessity for the frequent resort to curative statutes in an effort to avoid a complete
breakdown in the sources of revenue.
ERTAIN PROBLEMS

The steps which taxing authorities must follow are hedged
in by statutory requirements and the possibilities for error are
great. When they are multiplied by the thousands of taxing
districts in Illinois, the magnitude of the problems which can
be created is apparent, but attention to a few fundamental facts
will quickly reveal whether pitfalls can be avoided or, if not,
whether the effect of falling therein may be overcome by the
adoption of curative statutes. It should first be noted that authority to levy any tax at all must rest in statutory grant of
* A.B., LL. B. Member, Illinois bar, and faculty of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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power, constitutionally conferred by the legislature on the taxing
body. In the absence thereof, no tax levy could stand. The
municipalities of the state, at least in cases of organized districts having less than 500,000 inhabitants, gain their authority
through certain sections of the Cities and Villages Act. The
first of these specifies that the municipal authorities, within the
first quarter of the fiscal year, shall pass an annual appropriation ordinance in proper form' which shall have been published,
after adoption, in the manner required by law.2 When the total
amount of the annual appropriation has thus been determined,
the municipal authorities are then obliged, on or before the date
prescribed by statute, 3 to adopt a levy ordinance placing the burden of the sums appropriated upon the taxable property in the
municipal area. Certification of these ordinances to the county
officials results, in due time, in the making of assessments and the
issuance of tax bills.
Any failure to follow the general method outlined endangers
the collection of needed revenue and, if deviation occurs at what
may be regarded as jurisdictional points in the process, the tax
levy may be entirely void. If no protest is made, the taxpayer
who has discharged his obligation to his government is prevented
from complaining of any error in the taxing process. It is the
alert taxpayer, however, who will scan the municipal operation
closely and, not infrequently, uncover some defect upon which to
resist collection of the tax imposed. To offset this challenge, or
even the threat thereof, the municipal authorities seek recourse
to the curative statute which the obliging legislature enacts.
The term "curative act" is occasionally used to refer to
statutes designed to have prospective operation, that is to remedy
errors which have not yet occurred and which may arise in the
future. Illinois has long had one statute of that character,4 de1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 15--1.
Ibid., Ch. 24, § 10-3.
3 Ibid., Ch. 24, § 16--1.
4 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 177. It is a re-enactment of Section 191a of the Revenue Act
of 1872. A discussion of the scope thereof may be found in a note in 32 Ill. L. Rev.
456.
2
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signed to take care, automatically, of any of the irregularities
to which it may apply. Many defects, merely formal in nature,
constitute no threat to the validity of the taxing procedure because of the presence thereof. Thus this statute, or its predecessor, has been held to legalize an indefinite description of land
or the omission of the words "dollars" and "cents" from the
assessment roll;' the listing of property in the wrong book;6
the failure of a town clerk to certify the levy to the county
clerk at the proper time; 7 the oversight of the assessor to set
down the full value of the property as the assessed value ;" the
assessing of property in the wrong name ;9 or other like defects. 10
In general, however, curative statutes in Illinois have generally been designed to possess retroactive operation, serving to
correct errors, if operating to cure errors at all, that have already
taken place. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court once said, in
the case of People v. Illinois Central Railroad Company," that
''curative acts do not authorize the doing of anything in the
future, and the very nature of such acts must be and is wholly
retrospective. They relate solely to actions that have been performed and legalize the same. "'12 In the light of that statement,
and bearing in mind that the general curative statute above referred to is designed to deal with defects, errors and other
informalities which do not affect the "substantial justice of the
levy," it is apparent that the term "curative statute," as most
frequently used in Illinois, applies to enactments intended to be
People v. Brown, 261 Il. 73, 103 N. E. 559 (1913).
6 Wabash, St. L. & Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 11 (1883).
7 Thatcher v. People, 79 Ill. 597 (1875).
8 People v. Fleniing, 355 Ill. 91, 188 N. E. 818 (1933).
9 Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Carr, 303 Ill. 354, 135 N. E. 881 (1922); People v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co., 307 I1. 265, 138 N. E. 593 (1923).
10 Eurigh v. People, 79 Ill. 214 (1875).
5

11301 Ill. 288, 133 N. E. 779 (1921).
12 301 Ill. 288 at 297, 133 N. E. 779 at 782. See also People v. Kinsey. 294 Ill. 530,
128 N. E. 561 (1920). In People v. C.. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 305 Ill. 567 at 568, 137
N. E. 392 at 393 (1922), the court said: "The object of a curative act is not to
change the law governing future action, but to waive some requirement of the law
affecting past action."
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retrospective in operation 1 3 and planned to cure those defects
which do affect the "substantial justice" of the tax levy.
Absence of an appropriation ordinance in force at the time
of the levy, for example, could hardly be considered an "error
or informality" within the meaning of the general curative statute 14 and, even if it were, lack of publication thereof could scarcely
be considered aided by the statute for its purports to amend not
to supply original action, without which there is nothing to be
amended. The problem, then, is to ascertain how far the legislature may go in passing curative measures falling within the
second category, that is those enacted after the error of substance has occurred.
The power of a legislature to validate defective tax proceedings by the enactment of retroactive statutes, while universally
recognized, 15 is not without restraint for no statute can stand
which contravenes constitutional limitations. Illinois, in harmony
with other states, will not sanction curative acts which impair
vested rights, as where a taxpayer has changed his position before
attempt has been made to cure the defect, 16 or which purport to
interfere with the proper exercise of the judicial power, as by
seeking to upset a judicial declaration of tax invalidity pro13 Special curative acts have been employed, however, to cure merely formal defects which were probably legalized anyway by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, J 717.
See, for example, People v. I. C. R. R. Co., 301 Ill. 288, 133 N. E. 779 (1921), where
a validating act remedied the failure of a school board to return certificates of levy
at a proper time, and People v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 139 N. E. 113 (1923), where a
resolution, defective because passed at an improperly called meeting, was validated
by a curative act and the levy was saved.
14 In C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People, 193 Ill. 594 at 598, 61 N. E. 1100 at 1101
(1901), the court said: "The substantial justice of a tax is affected if it is one
which the authorities attempting to impose it have no power or right to impose.
Provisions of the statute designed for the protection of the taxpayer are mandatory,
and a disregard of them will render the tax illegal." It therefore held that Section
191a of the Revenue Act of 1872, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 717, did not
operate to validate a levy made at a time when the commissioners had no authority.
See also People v. McElroy, 248 Ill. 574, 94 N. E. 81 (1911), where the same section
was held not to save a tax when the appropriation ordinance was not enacted or
published within the first quarter of the fiscal year as required by a statute, the
provisions of which were deemed mandatory.
15 See annotation to People ex rel. Larson v. Thompson, 377 I1. 104, 35 N. E. (2d)
355 (1941), in 140 A. L. R. 959.
16 Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82 (1865).
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nounced before passage of the statute 7 To permit statutes of
that character to stand would be to deprive the taxpayer of property without due process of law. In addition to such general prohibitions, the Illinois Constitution of 1870 contains a restraint,
not frequently found elsewhere, prohibiting the legislature from
imposing taxes on the municipality or its inhabitants for corporate
purposes.' 8 This limitation, at times, has been found to serve
as a basis for declaring curative acts ineffective' but upon reasoning which has been limited to this state and which has not
20
found favor elsewhere.
So long as no constitutional prohibition is invaded, the Illinois Supreme Court has been willing to recognize that the legislature may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might
have authorized in advance. 2 1 While this principle has been stated
rather frequently, it should not be accepted entirely at its face
value for it would seem to indicate that the legislature has the
power to waive any procedural requirement, at some future time,
since almost all the taxing procedure is prescribed by the legislature. A succession of cases, however, has served to prove that
the legislature has no such sweeping power for it has been denied the right to provide a cure where there was (1) a funda17 See C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. People, 219 Ill. 408, 76 N. E. 571 (1905). where it
was held that, after a decision invalidating a tax for failure to itemize its purposes,
the legislature had no power to cure the defect.
's Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 10.
19 See cases listed in note 29, post.
20 In a note in 32 Ill. L. Rev. 456, at 471, it is stated that, of nine states having
constitutional provisions similar to that in Illinois, in two such states where the
question arose the Illinois interpretation was rejected. Curative acts were there
regarded not to amouzt to an "imposition" of a tax by the legislature contrary to
constitutional prohibition: Weber v. City of Helena, 89 Mont. 109, 297 P. 455
(1931) ; Owings v. City of Olympia, 88 Wash. 289, 152 P. 1019 (1915).
Cooley, Const.
21 See Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 (1948).
Lim., 8th Ed., p. 775, states: "If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings is something the necessity for
which the legislature might have dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not
beyond the power of the legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute.
And if the irregularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of
doing some act, which the legislature might have made immaterial by prior law,
it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by a subsequent law." The
latter sentence comes close to statements of the Illinois Supreme Court which
emphasize that the defect is curable if it relates to a mere immaterial irregularity,
a formal defect, or one not necessary to the exercise of the power. See cases cited
in notes 37 to 41 inclusive, post.
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mental lack of power to act, 22 (2) where there was no jurisdic24
tion to tax,23 or (3) where the entire tax proceeding was void.
It is not too clear how the court could distinguish between these
three situations, but the conclusion is apparent from the holdings that almost all of the attempts to cure what might be regarded as defects of a serious nature and which might come under
one or more of these heads have been ineffective.
By way of illustration, one need consider only a few of the
decisions on the subject. In the case of People ex rel. Ward v.
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Company,2 5 for example, the
board of supervisors had levied a tax, on December 12, 1934, for
Vermillion County although the statute required that the tax
levy should be made prior to December 1st. The legislature,
by an act approved on January 17, 1935, purported to grant to
such county boards as had omitted to levy by the proper date the
authority to make another levy 26 while also providing, through
another statute, that levies made after the first day of December
were valid. 2 7 The court held the curative act void, stating at
the time
The legislature may by statute validate the irregular or defective exercise of a power where the power already existed
and the proceeding sought 'to be cured was not one of the
fundamentals of the power exercised. However, the General
Assembly cannot give validity to the exercise of a power
where such assumed power did not exist at the time it was
purported to have been exercised. The power to levy a tax
22 People v. Thompson, 377 Il.
104, 35 N. E. (2d) 355 (1941) ; People v. Baum,
367 Ill. 249, 11 N. E. (2d) 373 (1937): People v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 365 Ill. 202,
6 N. E. (2d) 119 (1936); People v. Public Service Co., 328 Ill. 440, 159 N. E.
797 (1928) ; People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 310 Ill. 428, 141 N. E. 827 (1923);
People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923).
23 People v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 365 Ill. 202, 6 N. E. (2d) 119 (1936).
24 People v. Dearborn St. Bldg. Corp.. 372 Ill. 459, 24 N. E. (2d) 373 (1939)
People v. Southern ny. Co., 367 Ill. 389. 11 N. E. (2d) 602 (1937) : People v.
Wabash Ry. Co., 360 Ill. 173, 195 N. E. 665 (1935) ; People v. Bell, 309 Ill. 387,
141 N. E. 187 (1923); People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 321 Ill. 499, 152 N. E.
560 (1926).
25 365 Ill. 202, 6 N. E. (2d) 119 (1937).
26 Laws 1935, p. 685: H. B. No. 5.
27 Ibid., p. 685; H. B. No. 4.
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by an administrative body is jurisdictional. Jurisdiction to
act cannot be conferred by subsequent legislative acts where
the assumed power to act was lacking at the time the pur28
ported proceeding was had.
It also found that the attempted validation fell afoul of the constitutional restraint aforementioned in that the result, if upheld, would amount to the legislative imposition of a tax for
corporate purposes. 9
It may be noted that the court, when speaking of the "power
to levy," was not referring to an actual lack of authority on the
part of the board of supervisors for it is plain that the taxing
function had been validly delegated to that body. What happened in the case might more nearly be described as a defect
in procedure in the carrying out of that power. Such defects,
however, are not uncommonly referred to by the court as illustrating a "lack of power to act." In this respect, one should
bear in mind that the phrase "lack of power" possesses a different significance and has a contrasting meaning with the same
phrase when used in other municipal affairs for it then refers
to a complete absence of grant of authority from the legislature to the municipal corporation to indulge in the given activity.
In another case, that of People ex rel. Larson v. Thompson,"0
a forest preserve district passed an appropriation ordinance on
July 18, 1939, but failed to publish the same until the following
September 8th. The levy ordinance was passed on September
15th. The law required publication of the appropriation ordinance within ten days after its passage but declared that the
ordinance provisions should not become effective until ten days
28365 Ill. 202 at 207, 6 N. E. (2d) 119 at 122.
29 See also People v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 375 Ill. 85, 30 N. E. (2d) 739
(1940) ; People v. Orvis, 374 Ill. 536, 30 N. E. (2d) 28 (1940) ; People v. C. & E. I.
Ry. Co., 343 Ill. 101, 175 N. E. 4 (1931); People v. Public Service Co., 328 Ill.
440, 159 N. E. 797 (1928); People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 321 Ill. 499, 152
N. E. 560 (1926) ; People v. E., I. & St. L. Ry. Co.. 312 Ill. 134, 143 N. E. 431

(1924); People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co, 310 Ill. 212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923).
All
cases listed in notes 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and this one were cases which decided that
curative acts were incapable of validating defective levies.
30377 Ill. 104, 35 N. E.

(2d) 355 (1941).
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after publication. 3 1 Again the legislature enacted a curative
statute clearly intended to fit the case for it specified that such
levies were valid "notwithstanding that the publication of the
appropriation ordinance occurred more than ten days after its
passage and notwithstanding that the tax levy ordinance was
passed within ten days after the publication of the appropriation ordinance." '32 The court accepted the contention that the
requirement for publication within ten days after passage was
a directory one only, except that the appropriation measure could
not become effective until ten days after its eventual publication.
But it went on to find that the levy was void because passed at a
time when no enforcible appropriation ordinance existed. That
position was achieved by virtue of the fact that the appropriation
ordinance was considered not legal until September 18th, or
three days after the purported levy had been made. 83 The court
again adverted to the proposition that the district was absolutely without authority under the circumstances and reiterated
that no validating act could cure a "lack of authority to act at
all." ' 34 In effect, it accused the legislature of attempting to
confer the power to levy posthumously as well as of violating the
85
state constitution.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 57%, § 12.
IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 57%, § 15d.
33 In People v. Wabash Ry. Co., 360 Ill. 173, 195 N. E. 665 (1935), the court
held that a tax levy ordinance was void because not passed at a time when there
was a valid appropriation ordinance in force, since both ordinances were passed
by the village board at the same meeting, and the appropriation ordinance would
not be in force until 10 days after its publication. Accord: People v. C., C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 281 Ill. 152, 118 N. E. 1 (1917); People v. P. D. & E. R. R. Co., 116
Ill. 410, 6 N. E. 459 (1886). A levy has been declared void, even when made after
the appropriation ordinance, if the latter has not been published as required by
statute, the publication being in a foreign language newspaper: People v. Day, 277
So a tax levy ordinance passed before the approIll. 543, 115 N. E. 732 (1917).
priation ordinance has been published is clearly void: People v. Florville, 207 Ill.
79, 69 N. E. 623 (1903). Where the appropriation ordinance is published the day
after the levy ordinance Is passed, the levy is void for lack of a valid appropriation ordinance: People v. Wabash R. R. Co., 387 Ill. 450, 56 N. E. (2d) 820 (1944).
See also People v. I. C. R. R. Co., 396 Ill. 200, 71 N. E. (2d) 39 (1947).
34 377 Ill. 104 at 113, 35 N. E. (2d) 355 at 359. It might be questioned whether
this situation is one where the phrase "lack of authority to act at all" is technically
Iowever, levies have been uniformly held void for that reason, apaccurate.
parently on the reasoning that the power to levy is not conferred on the taxing
body until it has first properly passed and published an appropriation ordinance.
35 See also People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923),
holding the curative act of May 31, 1923, Laws 1923, p. 566, Incapable of validating
31
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Logically, the constitutional argument should be the real
basis for the decision so long as the court adheres to the interpretation it has placed on Article IX, Section 2 of the state constitution. But, for some reason, the court prefers to find the
curative act invalid because of the general principle that curative acts are inherently incapable of supplying a missing power
and then links up that conclusion with the constitutional issue.
The former rests upon a void proceeding for its force. The
latter more nearly turns on a "lack of power" or, what sometimes seems to be the equivalent in this regard, a "lack of jurisdiction" to tax.
In contrast, there have been cases in which curative acts
have been upheld on the rationale that the error corrected was
over a matter which the legislature "might have dispensed with
in the first place." 36 Thus insufficient itemization3 7 or failure
to itemize the particular purpose of the tax levy at all 8 may
be validated; defects produced by the fact that the tax was levied
at an unauthorized meeting have been cured;39 uncertainties in
the statement of purpose for the levy have been rectified ;40 and
defective schedules of claims have been remedied. 41 The superficial explanation for such results may rest in an expression of
the court, to be found in the case of People ex rel. Pearsall v.
The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company,42 to the
effect that the legislative power "to validate by curative law any
a tax levy made without first obtaining written consents of the town auditor at a
proper meeting as required by statute. The act was found to violate Ill. Const.
1870, Art. IX, § 10.
36 See note 21, ante.
37 A curative act validated the tax levy in People v. Mercil & Sons Co., 378 Il1.
142, 37 N. E. (2d) 839 (1941), where insufficient itemization had occurred, since
this was regarded merely as a defective exercise of a power existing in the city.
38 Failure to itemize does not go to the fundamental right to levy, so this defect
may be validated according to People v. C., M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 324 I1. 43, 154
N. E. 472 (1926). Accord: People v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 323 Ill.536, 154 N. E.
468 (1926); Bowyer v. People, 220 Ill.93, 77 N. E. 91 (1906); People v. Wis.
Central R. R. Co., 219 Ill. 94, 76 N. E. 80 (1905).
39 People v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 139 N. E. 113 (1923).
40 People v. Hamilton, 373 Ill. 124, 25 N. E. (2d) 517 (1940).
41 People v. Southern Ry. Co., 367 Ill. 389, 11 N. E. (2d) 602 (1937).
42310 Ill. 428, 141 N. E. 827 (1923).
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proceeding which it might have authorized in advance is limited
43
to the case of irregular exercise of power."
Reference to "irregular exercise of power," just as is true
with the phrase that the legislature may cure that which it "might
have dispensed with in the first place," is essentially meaningless
in describing the errors which may be cured for there are few
requirements which the legislature could not have dispensed with
had it chosen, while "irregular exercise" includes practically
anything which a taxing body could do in the wrong, as well as
the right, way. But even if the expressions be faulty, the idea
that things not necessary to the exercise of the power may be
waived is a valuable one to be set in contrast with the other
concept that "lack of jurisdiction" may not be overcome.
Aside from having cured occasional minor defects of the kind
above referred to, curative acts have met with little success in
Illinois. Errors in proceedings which affect the substantial justice of the tax 44 have generally been held incurable by validating statutes and, in some cases, the validating statutes themselves
have been held unconstitutional. 45 Other cases have resulted in
declarations by the court that it would not assume that the legislature had attempted to do that which it had no authority to do,
so no effort was made to apply the curative act to the invalid
proceeding it was designed to correct. 46 Taxes levied at an un43 310 Iii. 428 at 429, 141 N. E. 827 at 828.
44 See note 14, ante. A failure to itemize is more than an irregularity which
may be overlooked under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 120, § 717, but is such an irregularity that may be cured by a validating act "because the legislature might
have dispensed with the requirement in the first place." This defect has been
held not to go to the power to levy, even though it did affect the substantial
justice thereof, in People v. C., M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 324 Ill. 43, 154 N. E.
472 (1926).
45 See People v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 312 Ill. 216, 143 N. E. 464 (1924) ; People v.
T., St. L. & W. R. R. Co., 312 Ill. 201, 143 N. E. 417 (1924); People v. E. I. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 312 Ill. 134, 143 N. E. 431 (1924); People v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.,
312 Ill. 58, 143 N. E. 460 (1924); People v. Wabash Ry. Co., 311 Ill. 579, 143
N. E. 488 (1924) ; People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 311 Ill. 113, 142 N. E. 473 (1924) ;
People v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 310 Ill. 428, 141 N. E. 827 (1923) ; People v.
Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill.
212, 141 N. E. 822 (1923).
These cases all hold unconstitutional the act of May 31, 1923, purporting to validate an additional tax levy
made without the consent of the town auditors.
46 People v. Dearborn St. Bldg. Corp., 372 Ill. 459, 24 N. E. (2d) 373 (1939);
People v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 310 Ill.
495, 142 N. E. 176 (1924).

EFFECT OF CURATIVE STATUTES.

authorized excess rate have failed for want of an efficient cure. 47
The failure to obtain written consents of town auditors at proper
meetings, as required by statute, has not been remedied by
validating statute. 48 A bond issue, void because approved by
voters at an election called on improper notice, has likewise failed
despite legislative attempts to validate. 49 For that matter, an
attempt to make valid a bond issue, where the petition requesting
the election on the proposition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, has been turned down even though a majority
of the voters at the election had favored the issue. 50 Certainly,
then, where there is no valid organization of the taxing district,
any attempt to validate the levy of such an organization would
necessarily fail, for the power to tax never existed. 5 1
It is apparent, then, that the Illinois Supreme Court has taken
a dim view of attempts by the legislature to counteract the mistakes and omissions of the taxing authorities. It is somewhat
difficult to see upon what principle of justice a person may be
allowed to avoid his obligation to contribute to the support of
his local governmental unit merely because of oversight, accident,
or technical error on the part of the taxing officials. Rarely is
there a question of vested interests presented but, so long as the
court pursues its former views, those who object are relieved
of the tax burden while others, who do not, suffer added injury
by being forced, in subsequent years, to make up for the taxes
lost to the successful objector.
There may be occasion to hope, however, that the court might
change its views on the subject of the validity of curative stat47 The curative act of June 26, 1923, Laws 1923, p. 265, could not validate a tax
levied at an unauthorized excess rate since doing so would violate Ill. Const.
1870, Art. IX, § 10, according to People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141
N. R. 822 (1923). Accord: People v. Baum, 367 Ill. 249, 11 N. E. (2d) 373 (1937).
48 See note 35, ante.
49 People v. Ervin, 375 Ill. 435, 31 N. E. (2d) 789 (1940).
50 See People v. Riche, 396 Ill. 85, 71 N. E. (2d) 332 (1947) ; People v. Miller,
392 Ill. 445, 64 N. E. (2d) 869 (1946); People v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.. 391 Ill.
145, 62 N. E. (2d) 460 (1945); People v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 385 Ill. 86, 52
N. E. (2d) 255 (1944); People v. C. G. W. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 594, 41 N. E. (2d)
960 (1942) ; People v. Thompson, 377 Ill. 244, 36 N. E. (2d) 351 (1941).
51 Mauldlng v. Skillet Fork Drain. Dist., 313 Ill. 216, 145 N. E. 227 (1924).
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utes. As late as 1948, in the case of Owen v. Green,52 the Supreme Court made a statement which may recast the whole theory
of curative acts into a single formula. It there said
Where there is no constitutional prohibition, the legislature
may, by curative act, validate any proceeding which it might
have authorized in advance. The principal, if not the only,
exception to legislative power to ratify . . . is in tax levy
cases where section 10, article IX of the Constitution pre53
cludes the enactment of a curative act.
If that formula is followed, tax cases need not be complicated
in the future, as has been the case in the past, by distorted attempts to rationalize a result inconsistent with the general rule
governing the validity of curative statutes.
It is possible, in the not too distant future, that there may
be occasion for the court to give substance to that formula if it
feels so inclined for a serious problem looms over the revenues
of many of the taxing units of the state. The problem grows
out of the fact that, in 1947, the legislature amended Section
10-3 of the Cities and Villages Act. Prior to amendment, the
statute required that all ordinances designed to impose any fine,
penalty, imprisonment, or forfeiture, as well as those which made
any appropriation, should be printed in book or pamphlet form
by the corporate authorities or they should be published at least
once in a newspaper published in the city or village, or should
be posted, if no newspaper was published therein, all within one
month after passage. 54 Emphasis is given to the word "or"
since the law then clearly contemplated alternative forms for
giving notoriety to the intended ordinance. By the amendment
adopted in 1947, publication was permitted in any newspaper
of general circulation distributed in the municipality even though
not published therein, but posting was permitted in municipalities having less than 500 population. The period for publica52 400 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 (1948).
53 400 Il. 380 at 403-4, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 at 162.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 10-3.
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tion was also shortened from one month to ten days,5" so as to
conform the publication period to that found in other statutes
regulating certain particular governmental units.5 6 But, whether
intentionally or not, the amended statute, as passed, contained
the word "and" where previously had appeared the word "or,"
so that ordinances of the type mentioned, after 1947, should be
both printed in pamphlet form and be published in the manner
indicated.
Judging by the haste with which the legislature acted at its
last session, many taxing authorities in the state must have
failed to notice the minute but tremendously significant change
thus caused. It can only be supposed that substantial amounts of
revenue must have been in jeopardy, for the legislature not only
recast Section 10-3 of the Cities and Villages Act, replacing
"and" with "or" and making the amendment an emergency
measure, 57 but also tried to fill the breach with a curative statute
designed to validate all appropriation and levy ordinances passed
in the interim between the 1947 and the 1949 sessions.5 8 In general, the curative act purports to make valid not only all. taxes
levied despite failure to publish in the form required but also
those where publication of the annual appropriation ordinance
preceded the levy ordinance by only ten days. The problem, of
course, is whether this curative act, resembling other statutes
of the past, will prove to resemble them also in failing to provide
the hoped-for solution.
If the present court, when faced with tax objections based
upon municipal failure to comply with the requirements of Section 10-3 of the Cities and Villages Act as it stood before its
55 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 10-3.
56 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 57Y2 , § 12.
57 Laws 1949, p. -:
H. B. No. 49, §1. See also Smith-Hurd Stats. Ann., cum.
supp. June 1949, p. 44. Section 2 thereof states that whereas, "in order to prevent
an unnecessary and great expense and a serious embarrassment in the administration of municipal affairs, cities and villages must be immediately relieved of the
requirement heretofore existing that certain ordinances be published both in
book or pamphlet form and in certain newspapers, an emergency exists and this
act shall take effect upon its becoming a law." The phrasing conceals, but still
suggests, the thought that duplicate publication was probably not intentionally
imposed on municipalities.
58 Laws 1949, p. -:
H. B. No. 623, §§ 1 and 2. See also Smith-Hurd Stats. Ann.,
cum. supp. June 1949, p. 57; Ch. 24, §§ 697e2 and 697e3.
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recent re-amendment, follows in the footsteps of its predecessors
it can only conclude that the curative act is a nullity. Reference
need only be made to the case of People ex rel. Larson v. Thompson-" to sustain that conclusion, for it was there held that a curative measure designed to validate both an appropriation ordinance, void for want of publication at the proper time, and the
ensuing levy ordinance, void because not preceded by a valid
appropriation ordinance, was totally ineffective to cure either. If
further ammunition is needed, reference to the decisions previously noted on the inability of the legislature to retroactively
confer the power to levy a tax should be all that should be necessary. The prospects of success for the measure in question are,
therefore, quite dim.
But the opportunity will no doubt be presented for the court
to strike out afresh on the subject if it so wishes. It may elect
to confirm the formula of Owen v. Green6" and conclude that there
is no constitutional restraint upon a measure of this kind. It may
rationalize that "and" means "or," and vice versa, when the
subject warrants it. It may realize the governmental necessity
for revenue as well as the calamity which could ensue from a
wholesale deprival of taxes,6 ' and produce a decision not in keeping with those cited. There is reason to believe, however, that
it should re-interpret the Illinois Constitution in this respect
to find, as have other courts, 6 2 that there is no constitutional vice
in curative statutes remedying defects in taxation in the absence
of a clear-cut deprivation of property without due process of law.
59377 Ill. 104, 35 N. E. (2d) 227 (1941).
60400 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. (2d) 149 (1948).
61 When a defect threatened to invalidate a great number of tax proceedings in
Illinois on a prior occasion, the abstract principle of limitation on the scope
of curative statutes was overcome by such necessity: People v. N. Y. Central R. R.
Co., 282 Ill. 11, 118 N. E. 462 (1917). A statute providing for the organization of
school districts was there held unconstitutional but the validating statute was
allowed to stand. The defect certainly went to the jurisdiction of the taxing body
to act at all. Other cases involving the same statute are People v. Kessler, 282 Ill.
16, 118 N. E. 493 (1917) ; People v. Leigh, 282 Ill. 17, 118 N. E. 495 (1917) ; People
v. New York C. R. R. Co., 282 Ill. 19, 118
EN.
. 481 (1917) ; People v. Matthews,
282 Ill. 85, 118 N. E. 481 (1917) ; People v. K. & S. R. Co., 282 Ill. 541, 118 N. E.
753 (1918) ; People v. P., C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 284 Ill. 87, 119 N. E. 914 (1918) ;
People v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 285 Ill. 232, 120 N. E. 454 (1918).
Three justices
dissented in the Matthews case on the ground that the curative act violated the
state constitution.
62 For related cases from other jurisdictions, see annotation in 140 A. L. R. 959.

